Within Israeli decision-making circles, a decisive political–security conviction is taking shape: the deployment of any international stabilization force in the Gaza Strip cannot precede a change in the realities on the ground; rather, it must come as a result of such a change. According to this logic, the continued presence of Hamas as an armed force and de facto governing authority—outside what is known in Israeli terms as the “yellow line”—renders any potential international force a largely symbolic entity with limited powers, incapable of enforcing disarmament or bringing about a genuine security transformation. This conclusion constitutes the theoretical and political foundation upon which all “day after” approaches to the war on Gaza are built.
First: The Dilemma of an International Force — Between Peacekeeping and Enforced Confrontation
At the heart of the ongoing debate lies an unresolved problem: what exactly would be the mandate of the proposed international or Arab–Islamic force? Would it be a peacekeeping force, or a force tasked with engagement and confrontation with armed factions, foremost among them Hamas?
If what is required is a confrontational force, a fundamental question arises as to which party would be willing to send its soldiers into an environment of extreme complexity and danger. If, on the other hand, the force were to assume a police–administrative role focused on maintaining order, the question shifts to who would be responsible for disarming Hamas, in whose interest this would be done, and under what political or legal authority. The absence of clear answers to these questions turns the idea of an international force into an incomplete theoretical framework—closer to a political hypothesis than to an implementable plan.
This dilemma is further compounded by the issue of funding. Any potential stability is contingent upon large-scale reconstruction, which requires massive budgets that only major and wealthy states can provide. Without reconstruction, stability cannot be achieved; and without stability, there can be no viable environment for the functioning of any civilian or security administration.
Second: Israeli Will as an Indispensable Structural Condition
Available indicators suggest that no civilian or security mechanism, nor any administrative committee in Gaza, can succeed without genuine Israeli will—measured not by political statements, but by actions on the ground. These actions include removing barriers, accelerating the entry of aid, approving reconstruction projects, opening the Rafah crossing, and gradually withdrawing from the Strip.
In the absence of such steps, the entire process becomes little more than a “diplomatic ceremony devoid of substance.” Israeli assessments themselves affirm that the army will not withdraw from areas within the “yellow line” at this stage, and that any progress on reconstruction will remain conditional upon the disarmament of Hamas—thus trapping the entire plan in a vicious circle.
Third: Gaza Outside the International System’s Priority Ladder
These moves are taking place within an international context where the Gaza Strip does not occupy a prominent position on the global or U.S. agenda, amid escalating crises in Iran, Venezuela, and other regions. This reality adds a high degree of uncertainty to the proposed plans, making their success contingent on two key factors: the timing of the announcement of the “Peace Council” and the convening of a donor conference to determine the scale and scope of funding.
Fourth: Disarming Hamas — Between the Plan and the Bet
The White House is pushing for a broader approach to the concept of “disarmament,” one that goes beyond purely military considerations. In this context, the Egyptian plan endorsed by Washington has emerged. It envisions sidelining Hamas from official positions, restoring the Palestinian Authority in Gaza, and then launching a large-scale reconstruction process under international supervision, managed by a foreign force with international oversight.
Under this scenario, removing Hamas from power is expected to gradually dry up its financial resources. However, this plan carries a major gamble: will Hamas accept refraining from confrontation with foreign forces that threaten its influence? And will these forces endure if faced with actual resistance? Should clashes erupt, investors will flee, undermining the economic foundation of the plan.
Experts recognize that the full voluntary disarmament of Hamas is nearly impossible. Therefore, a partial disarmament option is proposed: destroying tunnels, rockets, and weapons factories while retaining light arms, under the justification of allowing the movement to defend itself against internal adversaries.
Fifth: The “Peace Council” — An Alternative to the United Nations?
One of the most controversial aspects of the U.S. plan is the push to grant a broad mandate to the “Peace Council,” whose role would not be limited to Gaza but could later extend to other international conflicts such as Ukraine, Venezuela, and Armenia–Azerbaijan. The council is presented as a new version of the United Nations, composed of selected countries making global decisions.
This proposal has raised Arab and Western concerns, due to fears of creating a parallel mechanism to the UN without international legal backing. Some Arab states preferred to limit the council’s work to Gaza only, linking any future expansion to the evaluation of the experiment’s results.
Sixth: The Technocrats’ Committee — Governance Without Sovereignty
In this context, a near-complete formation of the “Palestinian National Committee for Gaza Administration” was announced, composed of 15 Palestinian figures led by Ali Shaath, with portfolios distributed, while the security and police issues remain unresolved—this initiative is coordinated from inside the U.S. embassy in Egypt.
However, Israel objected to some names, particularly Amjad Al-Shawa, and the Shin Bet approved the final lineup on the basis that it did not include members from Hamas or the Palestinian Authority. The Israeli security establishment estimates that even if Hamas formally relinquishes civil governance, it will continue to manage the Strip behind the scenes through indirect networks of influence.
Seventh: The Palestinian–Egyptian Rift and the Authority’s Dilemma
These developments coincide with unprecedented tension in Palestinian–Egyptian relations, stemming from the Palestinian Authority’s fears that the Gaza administrative committee might be detached from the Palestinian government. This concern was met with outright rejection by the Authority, which emphasized the necessity of the committee’s political and legal linkage to the government.
Meanwhile, Palestinian sources indicate that Hamas has shown some flexibility toward certain approaches, but it refuses any agreement that disarms it or excludes the option of resistance as long as the occupation persists. Hamas ties any potential disarmament to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.
The Palestinian Authority’s silence regarding the announcement of the “Peace Council” cannot be separated from the structural marginalization it faces. The plan bypasses the Authority as a recognized political representative, treating Gaza as an independent security–administrative dossier. Yet, this silence may reflect conditional tacit acceptance, or a waiting strategy to gauge the extent of its future role.
Excluding the Palestinian Authority from the council’s leadership structure exposes a U.S.–Israeli trust deficit toward it and reinforces a trend toward alternatives that hollow out the concept of Palestinian sovereignty. Should the Authority be included, it would be reduced to a secondary partner in managing the crisis, rather than resolving it.
Most dangerously, the Authority’s acceptance of these arrangements could put it in confrontation with the Palestinian street, which sees the plan as an attempt to undo the achievements of steadfastness and resistance, reproducing a limited autonomy model under occupation.
The U.S. Peace Council: Peace or Recycled Guardianship?
The White House’s announcement of an executive founding council for the “Peace Council,” including figures such as Marco Rubio, Steve Witkoff, Jared Kushner, Tony Blair, Ajay Banga, and Nikolay Mladenov, reflects an American push to re-engineer Gaza after the war.
However, the council’s composition reveals the dominance of the U.S.–Western approach and the absence of genuine Palestinian representation. The appointment of Mladenov as “High Representative for Gaza” recalls models of international guardianship in Bosnia and Kosovo, where local sovereignty was suspended in the name of stability.
Strengthening the security dimension through the appointment of an American general to lead the stabilization force, and linking reconstruction to the disarmament of resistance, turns aid into a tool of political leverage. Meanwhile, the involvement of Kushner and Blair reproduces the “economic peace” approach, which ignored the roots of the conflict.
Concluding Outlook: Where Is the Palestinian Cause Headed?
These indicators reveal that the “day after” project in Gaza is not a coherent plan, but rather a political, security, and legal minefield. It is contingent on shifting power balances, on an Israeli will that is currently lacking, and on international readiness to bear a high cost. In the continued presence of occupation, the ambiguity surrounding the fate of weapons, and ongoing Palestinian division, the project remains suspended between ambitions of political re-engineering and an on-the-ground reality that imposes its own logic.
This leaves the central question open: is Gaza being prepared for genuine peace, or for a reproduction of control through softer yet more dangerous tools?
The rapid developments surrounding the “day after” arrangements in Gaza indicate that the Palestinian cause stands at an extremely perilous historical crossroads. What is being proposed today does not fall within the framework of a political solution that ends the occupation and restores the right to self-determination. Rather, it constitutes an attempt to re-manage the conflict using new instruments—seeking to convince the international community that “stability” can be achieved independently of justice, and that dismantling resistance can precede, or even replace, the dismantling of the system of occupation and settler colonialism.
First: Possible Trajectories
1. Entrenching a Model of Disguised International Guardianship
Should the “Peace Council” or any similar framework succeed in imposing itself as a supranational authority for governing Gaza, this would establish a model of long-term international guardianship. Palestinian territories would then be managed as a security–humanitarian issue rather than a national liberation cause. Such a trajectory would hollow out the concept of Palestinian sovereignty and reproduce the experience of limited self-rule under occupation, albeit with broader international cover.
2. Deepening the Geographic and Political Separation Between Gaza and the West Bank
Treating Gaza as a separate entity with its own administration, an international security force, and conditional funding would entrench the existing division and transform it from a temporary reality into a permanent structure. This serves the Israeli vision of managing Palestinians as fragmented entities rather than as a single people with a unified national project.
3. Redefining the Conflict From Political to Technical–Security Terms
Linking reconstruction to disarmament, and aid to security control, shifts the conflict from its political and legal dimensions to an administrative–technical one, where “success” is measured by the number of projects and infrastructure built, not by progress toward ending the occupation. This shift threatens to normalize a reality of domination rather than dismantle it.
4. Erosion of Palestinian Political Representation
The continued marginalization of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority within these arrangements—without a comprehensive national alternative—signals a dangerous representational vacuum. This vacuum may be filled by international or regional frameworks that do not reflect the Palestinian popular will, weakening the ability to defend national rights in international forums.
5. The Risk of Internal Social and Political Explosion
Any path perceived by Palestinians as liquidating the outcomes of steadfastness and resistance, or as circumventing the immense sacrifices made, carries within it the seeds of internal upheaval—whether in Gaza or the West Bank. Such upheaval could generate new waves of instability that would upend all the arrangements currently being proposed.
Second: What Is Required Nationally?
1. Restoring the Palestinian National Project
It is essential to reaffirm, in all forums, that no administrative or security arrangement can replace a political solution based on ending the occupation and dismantling settler colonialism. Gaza must not be treated as a separate issue from the broader Palestinian cause.
2. Building a Unified Palestinian Position
Call for an inclusive national dialogue involving all factions, including Hamas and Islamic Jihad, to reformulate a joint national strategy for managing the coming phase. Stop relying on external solutions that lack internal national legitimacy.
3. Accepting Reconstruction as an Unconditional Human Right
Reconstruction should be recognized as a humanitarian entitlement, not a political tool. Reject any equation that makes aid a substitute for rights or conditions it on depriving the Palestinian people of the means to defend themselves under occupation.
4. Legally and Politically Resisting International Guardianship
Challenge any framework that lacks a basis in international law and relevant UN resolutions. Utilize international legal avenues, including the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court, to highlight the colonial nature of the occupation and delegitimize imposed arrangements.
5. Rebuilding Legitimate Palestinian Representation
Work toward reviving the Palestine Liberation Organization on democratic foundations, including comprehensive elections where possible. Protect national decision-making from marginalization by involving civil society and popular forces in policy formulation.
6. Leveraging International and Regional Developments
Avoid total reliance on the U.S. administration. Expand the circle of international allies and transform global public sympathy for Palestine into organized political and legal pressure.
Conclusion
What is being prepared for Gaza today threatens not only the Strip but reshapes the future of the entire Palestinian cause. Either an approach is imposed that manages the conflict indefinitely under the banner of “stability,” or Palestinian forces succeed in redirecting the focus toward the essence of the struggle: freedom, self-determination, and justice.
At this pivotal moment, silence or tacit acceptance is more dangerous than outright rejection. National unity—not technical arrangements—remains the foremost condition for any viable Palestinian future.
Fouad Baker
Palestinian politician, jurist and member of CDLA