The Rights of Palestinian Refugees at the Mercy of Arms and Marginalization: An Analysis of Abbas’s Visit to Lebanon

Introduction:

Following Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas’s visit to Lebanon—and his affirmation that Palestinian arms should be exclusively under the control of the Lebanese state, alongside his call for granting Palestinian refugees their humanitarian, social, and economic rights—a joint Lebanese-Palestinian committee was promptly formed. This committee comprises official Palestinian figures without involving Palestinian organizations, whether within the framework of

the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) or outside it, along with Lebanese government

officials and the Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee. This move reflects significant

ambiguity about the future of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, especially in light of ongoing regional transformations and the considerable challenges facing the Palestinian cause. Notably, the focal point of media coverage of Abbas’s visit was not the rights of Palestinian refugees, but rather the issue of Palestinian arms in Lebanon.

The Lebanese-Palestinian Joint Committee

The Lebanese-Palestinian Joint Committee convened with the participation of its members,

including Azzam al-Ahmad, Secretary of the Executive Committee of the PLO; Yasser Abbas,

advisor to the Palestinian President; Ahmad Majdalani, member of the PLO Executive Committee; and Wael Lafi, legal advisor to the Palestinian President. On the Lebanese side, participants included Ambassador Ramez Dimashkieh, head of the Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee; Major General Hassan Shaqir, Director General of General Security; Brigadier General Mohammad Al-Sabaa, head of the Palestine Division in Lebanese General Security; Brigadier General Wadji Damian, head of the National Security Branch in Lebanese Army Intelligence; and Colonel Joseph Al-Gharbi, head of the Refugees and Foreigners Department in the National Security Branch, in addition to the team of the Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee.

The committee made decisions related to the commencement of Palestinian arms handover from the Palestinian camps starting mid-June 2025, with the Lebanese army tasked with this mission beginning in the Beirut camps, specifically Shatila and Mar Elias. A timeline was also established for the handover of arms in all Palestinian camps, in parallel with the approval of humanitarian, social, and economic rights for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.

What is particularly noteworthy is the absence of representation from Palestinian factions in the Joint Lebanese-Palestinian Committee, which includes only the Palestinian Authority. Also striking is the inclusion of Lebanese security agencies in the committee—an element that raises doubts and concerns, revealing the approach to the Palestinian file as one of security rather than humanitarian consideration.

The Dialogue Committee and the Marginalization of the Palestinian Joint Action Committee

While the Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee—which includes all Lebanese political parties and holds discussions and meetings with all Palestinian factions—has been trying to bring differing viewpoints closer together, the Lebanese-Palestinian Joint Committee has overstepped its authority, exceeding the powers of the Dialogue Committee. It now appears to impose its directives and decisions upon the Dialogue Committee, particularly in dealings with Palestinian factions it is supposed to be engaging in dialogue with, instead of conducting discussions and exchanging viewpoints.

This comes amid the exclusion of the Palestinian Joint Action Committee in Lebanon, which includes all Palestinian factions. This body was established in 2018 under the sponsorship of Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri and has played a fundamental role in unifying Palestinian efforts and serving as a unified Palestinian reference for managing dialogue with the Lebanese- Palestinian Dialogue Committee.

What is strange is the effort to nullify the authority of the National Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue

Committee, which is under the jurisdiction of Prime Minister Najib Mikati (note: you wrote Nawas Salam; if it refers to another figure, please clarify). Especially notable is that the Lebanese- Palestinian Joint Committee will operate directly with ministries and security agencies, while the Prime Minister seems to be attempting to distance himself from any future decisions that may negatively affect Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, by shifting full responsibility to the Joint Committee rather than the Dialogue Committee, which falls under his authority.

Based on the outcomes of President Mahmoud Abbas’s visit to Lebanon, he seems to reaffirm the legitimacy of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and is working to undermine the role of Hamas and Islamic Jihad. This is evident in the direct handling of issues related to Palestinian camps, essentially meaning that major files are managed exclusively between the Abbas and Aoun administrations. Lebanese authorities

are cooperating with the Palestinian Authority to notify all Palestinians in Lebanon that the PLO is the sole body authorized to manage security within the camps. This implies an end to any coordination between Lebanese security agencies and any other Palestinian faction.

Attempt to Exclude Palestinian Factions from the Visit

Some observers believe that President Mahmoud Abbas’s visit to Beirut was accompanied by increased external pressure to expel senior Hamas officials from Lebanon. This move is seen as an effort to constrain and weaken Hamas within the camps, rendering it incapable of resisting the disarmament process, while also eliminating any effective framework for enabling a genuine Lebanese-Palestinian national dialogue. In this context, President Abbas submitted proposals to the Lebanese government to form three committees: one for political relations, another for security matters, and a third for rights and services.

There is also concern over the vague mechanisms for implementing the outcomes of Abbas’s visit to Lebanon—particularly regarding the process of disarming Palestinian factions, which remains unclear and has not been officially discussed with any Palestinian factions, whether inside or outside the PLO. With the continued exclusion of the Palestinian Joint Action Committee, several Palestinian factions reject President Abbas’s unilateral decision-making. Lebanese newspapers

have even reported that the newly appointed Palestinian Vice President, Hussein Al-Sheikh, is

working to reshape diplomatic representation in Lebanon and elsewhere. Discussions are allegedly underway with Ambassador Ashraf Dabbour about incorporating him into the Palestinian leadership’s Central Committee in exchange for appointing a new ambassador in Beirut. The goal appears to be making the Palestinian embassy in Beirut the sole point of reference and cutting off communication with all other active Palestinian factions.

Although President Mahmoud Abbas did meet with the leadership of PLO factions in Lebanon,

the meeting did not address the committee’s working mechanisms. It was an ordinary meeting that did not present any practical plan or realistic vision for how the Lebanese-Palestinian Joint Committee will operate.

Overview of the Branches of Palestinian Arms in Lebanon

Palestinian weaponry in Lebanon can be categorized into four main branches:

1. Weapons under the auspices of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO):

This is the only category managed by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. It represents the legitimate Palestinian arms that officially coordinate with the Lebanese state for

maintaining security inside the Palestinian refugee camps.

2. Weapons of Hamas and Islamic Jihad:

These are regionally-oriented arms, not affiliated with the PLO or with Lebanon directly.

This category operates in coordination with Hezbollah and the Lebanese resistance. The

fate of these arms depends on the outcomes of bilateral dialogues between the President of

Lebanon, Joseph Aoun, and Hezbollah.

3. Weapons of Palestinian factions formerly supported by the Syrian regime:

These include factions like Fatah al-Intifada and the Popular Front – General Command.

Following the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, their weapons outside the

camps were handed over to the Lebanese state.

4. Weapons of extremist Islamist groups:

Among the most prominent are Asbat al-Ansar, led by Ibrahim al-Saadi (aka Abu Mohjen),

who has been in hiding since the 1990s; the Mujahideen Islamic Movement; Ansar Allah

led by Jamal Suleiman; and the Muslim Youth Organization. These groups receive both

regional and internal Lebanese support.

Finally, there is the category of personal weapons owned by some Palestinian refugees. This phenomenon is widespread in Lebanon, where most Lebanese themselves also possess personal firearms.

This complex and fragmented situation regarding the sources of Palestinian arms in Lebanon significantly complicates the issue. If the PLO were to hand over its weapons while other Palestinian organizations do not, the PLO would be weakened, undermining the only official Palestinian reference body that coordinates with the Lebanese state and represents Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.

As for the weapons of Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Lebanon, they have not been used, except during the recent war, in which they coordinated with Hezbollah and fought alongside the Lebanese resistance to thwart the Israeli project and defend Lebanon.

Therefore, portraying Palestinian arms with legitimate reference—whether under the PLO, Hamas, or Islamic Jihad—as rogue or destabilizing is inaccurate. These arms have not contributed to Lebanese internal instability over the past thirty years and have posed no threat to Lebanon. On the contrary, they are disciplined. The real issue lies not with organized Palestinian factions, but rather with the unchecked spread of personal weapons across all segments of Lebanese society,

including extremist Islamist groups supported by various regional and internal Lebanese actors.

It is important to note that all Palestinian weapons located outside the refugee camps have been completely handed over to the Lebanese Army and State. The only remaining arms are inside the refugee camps. This is due to two key factors:

• The symbolic value tied to the Palestinian revolution and the legacy of the resistance.

• The need to protect the camps from external attacks, especially in light of growing Israeli threats. In the recent war, Israel attempted a ground incursion into Lebanon and aimed to massacre Palestinian refugees—similar to the Sabra and Shatila massacre, which was carried out by the Israeli army and certain right-wing Christian Lebanese militias after the PLO handed over its weapons under American guarantees

Disarmament or Regulation?

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas is fully aware of the grave implications of disarming

Palestinian factions in Lebanon, especially in light of the bitter experiences endured by Palestinian refugees there. He also understands that he cannot unilaterally make such decisions, as doing so would only complicate matters further—particularly given the critical challenges currently facing the Palestinian cause, including attempts to eliminate the right of return and undermine the refugee issue, as part of the ongoing U.S.-Israeli plans and their war on UNRWA.

Disarming Palestinian factions would likely escalate tensions within the camps—between different factions as well as between Palestinians and Lebanese groups—potentially leading to serious security threats and destabilization, rather than calm.

For this reason, President Abbas has proposed addressing the issue through the regulation—not disarmament—of weapons within the Palestinian refugee camps. Discussions within the Lebanese–Palestinian Joint Committee have started from the premise that there are no heavy weapons in the camps and that any weaponry capable of destabilizing regional security was located outside the camps and has already been handed over to the Lebanese state.

The PLO has been working on a mechanism to regulate arms inside the camps, through a program aimed at establishing a dedicated security apparatus responsible for internal camp security, in coordination with Lebanese authorities. This would include a commitment to clearing the camps of individuals wanted by the Lebanese state—whether for terrorism or criminal offenses—and cracking down on drug trafficking.

So What’s the Solution?

The first essential step is to revive the Joint Palestinian Action Committee, which includes all

Palestinian factions. It's impossible to address the situation of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon

without a unified Palestinian reference body capable of managing dialogue with the Lebanesecstate, and of developing a comprehensive plan for regulating weapons within the camps.

This dialogue must proceed in coordination with the Lebanese state and must be insulated from media-driven campaigns that aim to sow division and politicize the Palestinian presence in Lebanon. Certain Lebanese groups exploit the Palestinian arms issue to incite public sentiment against Palestinian refugees and to create internal Lebanese pressure on Hezbollah and the Lebanese resistance to disarm.

Moreover, it’s crucial to discuss the human, social, and economic rights of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, and to avoid trading their civil rights for disarmament. Lebanese officials should refrain from viewing Palestinian refugees through a purely security lens or portraying the camps as lawless zones. The camps symbolize the refugees’ commitment to the right of return and rejection of resettlement or displacement schemes.

A rational and measured approach to regulating weapons must include ongoing and reciprocal dialogue with the Palestinian factions. It's important to note that most Palestinian camps are already surrounded by Lebanese Army checkpoints, and personal weapons are often purchased from outside the camps. When the Lebanese state asserts control over its borders and cracks down on arms trafficking, it will naturally impact the flow of personal weapons into the camps—since no weapons are manufactured inside the camps.

In Conclusion

The issue of Palestinian weapons in Lebanon must be addressed outside the scope of internal Lebanese political rivalries, which often instrumentalize the issue to settle domestic scores. Refugees in Lebanon must be treated from a humanitarian perspective, as a people with a national cause that they have been fighting for over 77 years.

Through dialogue and continuous discussions with Palestinian factions, the regulation of weapons within the camps can be achieved without conflict or foreign interference. If disarmament is forced, it could ignite a new war—threatening Lebanon’s stability first, and then destroying the refugee camps, effectively nullifying the right of return. The only beneficiary of such a scenario would be Israel.

Thus, a rational and cooperative approach to regulating Palestinian arms is a shared

Lebanese–Palestinian interest.

Fouad Baker

Palestinian Politician, Jurist and Honourable Member of Cyprus Democratic Lawyers Association